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WHAT THE HUMANITIES ARE FOR – A SEMIOTIC 
PERSPECTIVE  Paul Cobley 
Middlesex University, London 
 
 
Abstract: In the wake of both 9/11 and the financial crisis of 2008, the humanities have been offered 
as constituents of higher education which, if more prominent and more strenuously promoted, might 
have prevented both events. At the same time, the humanities have undergone an assault from 
governments in the West, with massively reduced or wholly cut funding as part of an attempt to 
promote science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) in universities. The response from 
parts of the humanities to these government initiatives has been strident, insisting that a thriving 
humanities or liberal arts curriculum is crucial to democracy, ethics and citizenship, and that the 
humanities should be an essential ingredient of science and business education. Contemporary 
semiotics’ deployment of the concept of Umwelt demonstrates that the contribution the humanities 
might make to theory, practice and social life remains indispensable. Yet this contribution is of a rather 
different character to that portrayed in the traditional defence of ’humanistic’ study. Indeed, the 
example of semiotics reveals that the humanities themselves are regularly misconceived. 
 
 A personal story illustrates one of the main points in what follows. When I was about 10 years old, I was standing outside the surgery of the local general practitioner, looking at the plaque near the front door. I turned to my dad, asking why doctors need to have so many qualifications, why they have to leave school with a range of exams passed rather than simply focusing on the practice of medicine as their one and only subject. My dad, described on my birth certificate as a “wheel turner” for the Ford Motor Company, someone who had left school at 14 and was placed as one of the most lowly functionaries of late capitalism, was able to reply with a degree of insight which, unfortunately, seems to be beyond that of many senior managers in universities, education policymakers and powerbrokers. His reply to my questions was that it is necessary for doctors to demonstrate that their minds are active in other subject areas than just medicine so that their specialism is not merely a matter of niched competence, that it is informed from without and also because they need to be able to carry out the great many diverse tasks involved in their job.  In light of this, it is interesting to recall that one accusation frequently lodged at semiotics, both from within and outside the academy, is that it is insufficiently specialised. Semiotics does not always fit into disciplinary compounds or institutional enclaves, both of which latter are reified, although often of only recent vintage. In contrast to subjects in the humanities, semiotics has not become institutionalised. Some think it is synonymous with linguistics; others think semiotics’ home is in visual culture and the study of the non-linguistic; yet others see it as a literary ‘method’. Much of this is a hangover from the fashionable moment of semiotics from the period of, roughly, the 1960s to the 1980s, when semiotics seemed to many to be like a kind of magical decoding device. The one benefit for semiotics that lingers from that period, is that semiotics, despite massive change and development in the last three decades, is still largely associated with the power of utility (pace the tedious arguments about ‘audiences’ meanings’ – see Cannizzaro and Cobley 2015). The humanities, by contrast, are 
currently under assault for their perceived lack of utility. As will be seen, the humanities are 
found wanting in the face of the putative utility of science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM), and they are increasingly called upon to demonstrate direct economic 
use-value. Subject areas such as medieval history are seen by critics of the humanities as 
being arcane, over-specialised and divorced from the brute economic realities which are 
supposedly paramount in contemporary life.  
 
Without wishing to draw too facile a distinction, semiotics is accused of being over-
generalised, despite having some of the flavour of practicality that is imputed to the sciences; 
the humanities are accused of being over-specialised and without demonstrable utility. 
Although the intent here is not to rely on this distinction, it does serve as a starting point to 
discuss the pratfalls of a knee-jerk defence of the humanities, and to suggest that a more 
nuanced response to the assault on liberal arts education in general ─ a response which might 
be decisively informed by semiotics ─ could be put centre stage in common understandings 
of what the humanities are for. That a more convincing response to the assault is desperately 
needed is demonstrated by the fact that the squeezing of the humanities, and the universities 
that house them, has accelerated even in the face of two key events in the last fifteen years.  
 
First, in the wake of 9/11 there was a commonly-held view that the terrorists used 
education in a purely instrumental fashion; The 9/11 Commission Report assiduously lists the 
university affiliations of the main conspirators, all of whom studied science and technology, 
apart from Hani Hanjour who sojourned in the United States to study English and later took 
flying lessons. Indeed, some have pointed to the prevalence of ex-engineering students in 
terrorist attacks (Popper 2009, Gambetta and Herzog 2007), ultimately leading to the question 
“Is there something in an engineering education, such as that of 9/11 attacker Mohamed Atta, 
that, due to a lack of a component of humanities study, could lead to a lack of compassion for 
others?” (Bryson 2010).  
 
Secondly, the financial crisis of 2008 brought to the fore much hand wringing that had 
been already fomenting in business schools (see Ghoshal 2005), centred on the dehumanizing 
process of business education. As the full extent of the catastrophe of subprime lending at the 
turn of the twenty-first century was becoming clear, many called for a renewal of the 
humanities and an infusion of liberal arts into business schools (for example, Colby et al 
2011).  
 
Yet such considerations have  cut no ice with governments. In the UK, for example, a 
key plank of the post-2010 Tory government’s policy has been to cut all funding to 
humanities in universities through raising fees for all humanities subjects. 
 
That the humanities as a whole is failing to articulate its worth in contributing to the 
activity of the mind in the current climate is cause for concern. Addressing this from the 
standpoint of semiotics, the following topics will be considered: ‘The humanities’ own public 
relations’; ‘The ‘other’ humanities’, ‘Transdisciplinarity’, ‘Ethics’, ‘Anti-humanism’, 
‘Agency and Umwelt’.  Finally, I will attempt to formulate ‘What the humanities are for’.   
The humanities’ own public relations 
 
The ‘rise’ of the humanities can be traced back to Cicero’s concept of humanitas – 
being good – and its development in Western education, particularly the trivium and 
quadrivium of medieval philosophy faculties, embracing humanities and natural sciences 
alike, as against the professions (medicine, law, theology). Closer to our time, though, the 
humanities in their most familiar form are a product of nineteenth-century Western education: 
they developed in tandem with the forging of a liberal hegemony in industrial society of that 
period and contributed to the reproduction, through instruction - in what is civilized and 
‘good’  ─  of the bourgeois class in their mercantile and civic incarnations. Again, the 
philosophical faculty contained humanities as well as sciences (as is still the case in the 
Liberal Arts programmes in the US), while the natural sciences only became autonomous in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. The decline of the humanities has arguably occurred 
steadily through the same period in the face of the rise of the natural sciences (Kagan 2009), 
but most rapidly with Western governments’ promotion of STEM in the academy during 
recent decades, managed through a crisis of funding. 
 
As far as business schools have been concerned, the putative humanizing value of the 
humanities has been asserted repeatedly at crisis points in late capitalism. During the Cold 
War, McAllister’s quasi-ethnographic study Business Executives and the Humanities (1951) 
gave voice to numerous managers who valued, above all, a liberal arts/humanities background 
for their recruits. These aspirations or requirements were echoed later in the decade by the 
Carnegie Foundation study (Pierson 1959) and the Ford Foundation study (Gordon and 
Howell 1959), each concerned with business and higher education. In the Reagan era, the 
American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business report (Lyman and McKibbin 1988) 
made similar noises, followed in turn by the report of the American Council of Learned 
Societies (1988). By the early twenty-first century, a full-blown crisis in business schools 
seemed to have developed globally, with numerous critics calling for the re-humanization of 
business education, usually by way of compulsory humanities modules. Ghoshal 2005 has 
already been mentioned; preceding him, Pfeffer and Fong 2002 and Mintzberg 2004 could be 
added, along with, later, Bennis and O’Toole 2005: Starkey and Tempest 2006, Starkey and 
Tiratsoo 2007 and Morsing and Rovira 2011 and those reporting inept practice by business 
school graduates (Feldman 2005; Blasco 2009). A recent milestone in this train of thought is 
the Carnegie Report, which concluded (Colby et al 2011: 5):  “Like all undergraduates, 
business students need the ability to grasp the pluralism in ways of thinking and acting that is 
so salient a characteristic of the contemporary world”. That pluralism, which the report 
suggests is fostered by the humanities, is assumed to be lacking in business graduates but 
also, it might be said, among religious fundamentalists, particularly those who would inflict 
terror.   
If the situation was not sufficiently overdetermined already, the last decade also saw a 
major crisis in Western universities as a whole. In another ethnography, lightly 
‘fictionalized’, Tuchman 2009 pithily illustrated some of the nodal points of the crisis, 
witnessing the adversarial pitting of a management class against an intellectual class and the 
‘deprofessionalization’ that has beset university professors in similar ways to its infliction on 
lawyers and doctors. With managers in the ascendant, along with context-free accountants 
scouring university spreadsheets (no doubt following an education in business that the 
authorities in the previous paragraph would deplore), it was unsurprising that questions began 
to be raised by apparent ingenues about what universities are for. In addition to asking 
whether it is really worth employing certain professors and buying certain equipment for 
universities, accountants’ questions about the contribution of certain subject areas to direct 
economic growth become inevitable. As Collini (2012: 144-5) notes,  
 
[I]t’s usually at this point in the argument that an appearance is made by one of the 
more bizarre and exotic products of the human imagination, a wholly fictive place 
called ‘the real world’. This sumptuously improbable fantasy is quite unlike the actual 
world you and I live in. In the actual world that we’re familiar with, there are all kinds 
of different people doing all kinds of different things – sometimes taking pleasure in 
their work, sometimes expressing themselves aesthetically, sometimes falling in love, 
sometimes telling themselves that if they didn’t laugh they’d cry, sometimes wondering 
what it all means, and so on. But this invented entity called ‘the real world’ is inhabited 
exclusively by hard-faced robots who devote themselves single-mindedly to the task of 
making money. They work and then they die. Actually, in the fictional accounts of ‘the 
real world’ that I’ve read, they don’t ever seem to mention dying, perhaps because 
they’re afraid that if they did it might cause the robots to stop working for a bit and to 
start expressing themselves, falling in love, wondering what it all means, and so on, 
and once that happened, of course, ‘the real world’ wouldn’t seem so special anymore, 
but would just be like the ordinary old world we’re used to. Personally, I’ve never been 
able to take this so-called ‘real world’ very seriously. It’s obviously the brainchild of 
cloistered businessmen, living in their ivory factories and out of touch with the kinds of 
things that matter to ordinary people like you and me. They should get out more. 
 
He is not wrong. Indeed, Collini’s characteristically witty observation should serve as the 
standard riposte to any blinkered imbecile who dares to hide behind the myth of the 
economically hard-nosed ‘real world’. However, as will be argued, Collini’s eloquent defence 
of the humanities as worthwhile amidst the university crisis  ─ because they are “inherently” 
good or interesting ─ is not tenable on its own. 
 
In response to the more recent attacks, the defence of the humanities has been 
undertaken by numerous of its representatives besides Collini in the last few years, often re-
hashing jaded ideas from the very liberal hegemony which has lately sought to condemn the 
humanities to, at best, marginal status in society and, at worst, oblivion. Thus, the humanities 
have been cast by their defenders as the repository of ‘values’ (McDonald 2011) or, even 
more pointedly, ‘good’ values as opposed to “our current values and their devastating 
consequences on a precarious world” (O’Gorman 2011: 281). The humanities, it has been 
claimed, teach people how to live their lives (Andrews 1994: 163), they condense collective 
experience (Bate 2011: 66) and they preserve both democracy (Nussbaum 2010) and 
civilization (Watt 2011: 205). A further confection on liberal protestations in favour of saving 
the humanities is located at the intersection of national languages, ethics, and 
multiculturalism. Other languages, the argument goes, enrich our culture (Kelly 2011; 
Freeman 1994) and allow knowledge of ‘the other’ in a fashion that, at the very least, 
provides the platform for an ethical standpoint. The humanities are seen as crucial to 
promoting diversity – teaching students to work with others who are not like them (Tuchman 
2009: 208) – because, unlike approaches in some business schools, for example, the 
humanities are putatively opposed, in their very existence, to de-humanization. Echoing 
psychologists such as Zimbardo and Milgram, as well as prominent critics of business 
education from within business schools, such as Ghoshal (2005) and De George (1994), 
Nussbaum (2010: 23) insists that “It is easier to treat people as objects to be manipulated if 
you have never learned any other way to see them”. The acme of such humanist hyperbole 
regarding the humanities is where such arguments reveal their fragile basis and give way to 
the ridiculous; the words of the broadcaster and academic, Mary Beard (2001: 26), on the 
preservation of classics because it “is a subject at which the British do very well indeed”, 
reflected by Parker Pearson 2011 on archaeology and Howard 2011 on British academia in 
general, lie in this domain.  
 
By contrast, there is a sublime position growing out of the definition of the humanities 
as fostering harmony or standing against de-humanization. Here, the discussion of the 
immediate use-value of the humanities is repudiated in favour of a subtle formulation of 
inherent worth. Bate 2011 shows that the ‘value’ of the humanities cannot be calculated in the 
immediate way that many translations of scientific developments into technological advance 
can. In the wake of 9/11 and resurgent Islamic fundamentalism, he writes (2011: 2), “it was 
perhaps unfortunate that the swingeing funding cuts to higher education in the early 1980s fell 
with particular severity on supposedly marginal areas of the humanities, such as ‘Islamic 
Studies’”. More emphatic, still, is Fish’s (2008: 14) refusal to rise to the challenge: 
 
To the question ‘of what use are the humanities?’, the only honest answer is none 
whatsoever. And it is an answer that brings honor to its subject. Justification, after all, 
confers value on an activity from a perspective outside its performance. An activity that 
cannot be justified is an activity that refuses to regard itself as instrumental to some 
larger good. The humanities are their own good. There is nothing more to say, and 
anything that is said . . . diminishes the object of its supposed praise. 
 
Fish, here, is responding in particular to those who would attempt to furnish the humanities 
with ‘effects’ or ‘results’ in the manner of some areas of the sciences and business. 
Nevertheless, it is a view broadly shared with some other contemporary commentators (cf. 
Collini 2012) on the threatened demolition of universities.  
 
There is a need to be clear about the terminus of such arguments about the humanities. 
Fish and others seem to be converging on that well-known shibboleth, common to discussions 
in many degree review and validation processes in universities: ‘knowledge for its own sake’. 
While it is a worthy aspiration, it is strictly an intellectual version of the Land of Cockaigne, 
the preserve of those with private incomes. Likewise, the notion of the humanities as a 
civilizing tool, a less trenchant view but one nevertheless similarly drawing on individualist 
and humanist roots like ‘knowledge for its own sake’, is ultimately self-defeating. Tuchman 
(2009: 208) sees the humanities as promoting diversity and teaching students to work with 
others who are not like them; O’Brien (2010: ix) and Nussbaum (2010: 7) insist they are 
essential for democracy; and Pugès (2011: 61) claims they are instrumental in understanding 
other cultures and experiences, enabling people to keep an open mind. All of these arguments, 
however, are functionalist: they see the humanities as social tools, rather than necessary 
extensions of humans’ cognitive bearing as a species. Thus, the obvious example of 
‘intercultural communication’, a laudable area of investigation in communication sciences, 
was swiftly co-opted as a management tool, in much the same way as ‘ethics’ and ‘diversity’ 
are now (Nelson, Poms and Wolf 2012). It is difficult to escape the conclusion that “The 
humanities is an often overindulged and oversold commodity, especially in the hands of 
liberal arts college presidents and some recent secretaries of education” (Solomon 1994: 48). 
It is also clear that the version of the humanities that is oversold is not necessarily familiar to 
those who teach and publish in the discipline. 
 
 
The ‘other’ humanities 
 
In his excoriation of business school practice, Ghoshal asks (2005: 83−84):  
 
why does the pessimistic model of people as purely self-interested beings still so 
dominate management-related theories? The answer lies not in evidence but in 
ideology . . . The roots of the ideology lie in the philosophy of radical individualism 
articulated, among others, by Hume, Bentham, and Locke. 
 
As is also argued in the current essay, Ghoshal is pointing out that if one wishes to address 
ideology – including that ideology which has culminated in an attempt to banish the 
humanities - then the last people one would want to consult are humanists. The project of de-
humanization which is integral to the subordination of people to so-called the ‘real world’ is a 
logical outgrowth of the ideology in which humans are compelled to realise themselves as 
individuals - at all costs. Althusser 1969 made this point, in compelling fashion, many years 
ago. However, it has not curtailed the assumption, on the part of those outside the humanities, 
that the humanities is predicated on, and begets, both humanism and individualism. 
 
Nevertheless, the simple point can be asserted: the humanities are not necessarily 
humanist. Indeed, the virtues that the humanists have found to be universal and enriching 
have been repeatedly repudiated as oppressive by such fields as postcolonialism. The subject 
area in which I have spent most of my time, institutionally - communications, media and 
cultural studies – has consistently, implicitly and explicitly, challenged such humanist 
edifices as the canon and authorship of the ‘best’, while introducing questions to do with the 
fragmentation of contemporary identity. Semiotics has done the same – but more 
systematically, with commitment to transdisciplinarity and without automatic disdain for 
science. When one considers such features of the modern humanities landscape which are not 
entrenched in a humanist liberal arts paradigm, then many other approaches and fields start to 
add their names: social constructionism, poststructuralism, deconstruction, posthumanism, 
systems theory, radical constructivism and, again, postcolonialism. In their most productive 
guises, what has characterised all of the above has been a commitment to transdisciplinarity. 
 
 
Transdisciplinarity 
 
Although semiotics traces its genealogy back to the Hippocratic Corpus of symptoms, 
its presence in the academy as a formal pursuit owes much to what might be called ‘the 
synchronic moment’ in the twentieth century (cf. Deely 2010). That moment, when analysis 
of the products of human endeavour gradually started to replace valorization of discrete 
cultural artifacts, was also key to the inauguration of transdisciplinarity. It was represented by 
the work of Saussure in Switzerland; Propp and the Formalists in Russia; Ogden, Richards, 
Empson and Leavis in Britain; the New Criticism, Innis, McLuhan and Frye in North 
America; the structuralists in France; the Prague Linguistic Circle in Czechoslovakia; so-
called ‘Soviet semiotics’; the Copenhagen School in Denmark; systems theory and 
cybernetics in Europe and the Americas. Thus, the synchronic moment, where close reading 
or analysis came to the fore, witnesses a significant change in some of the key disciplines of 
the humanities in the second part of the twentieth century. Linguistics became less concerned 
with teaching foreign languages and more dedicated to the workings of language in general, 
drawing, especially, on semiotics’ separation of linguistics into ‘syntactics’, ‘semantics’ and 
‘pragmatics’. A good proportion of contemporary literary study became devoted to analysis 
of the workings of literariness rather than trying to wheedle out what is ‘the best’ that has 
been thought and written. An indication of how far literary studies has come through 
reinventing itself in the last thirty years is offered by some of the innovative work emanating 
from the Society for Literature, Science and the Arts. In the Fine Arts which, by virtue partly 
of their name, are still somewhat wedded to notions of the sublime, there has nevertheless 
been a move away from pure aesthetics to greater consideration of the concept of design. In 
philosophy, the elusive ‘good life’ has been superseded by a focus on analysis, criticality and 
unpredictability. 
 
The prime mover in the majority of these instances has been the emergence of the idea 
of the text, developed, of course, by semiotics but with a remit and reach that has not only 
facilitated transdisciplinary approaches but also made text’s predicates part of common 
parlance in the humanities. In the early writings on the topic, by the idea’s simultaneous but 
unconnected originators, Barthes 1977 and Lotman 1982, it is possible to discern the struggle 
to make the concept emerge (cf. Marrone 2014). Despite this struggle, the testimony to text’s 
fecundity is in how quickly the concept of was taken up by other scholars in the wake of the 
synchronic moment. Such scholars were bearers of a transdisciplinary perspective on their 
subject areas, demonstrating by reference to ‘text’ how manifestations of art, literature, 
philosophy, and verbal language are not instances of magic but specific exemplifications of a 
more general textuality. Clearly, the notion of text was instrumental in closing the ‘great 
divide’ (Huyssen 1986) between high and low culture. This is something I recognized early in 
my career in higher education as I began teaching popular narrative, with an emphasis on 
close reading, to cabinet makers in a General Studies (liberal arts) department. This soon 
metamorphosed into the teaching of communication theory, particularly the theoretical 
underpinnings to conducting close analysis. Central to the movement away from appreciating 
‘quality’ to analysis of texts is the dimension of social class. The concept of the text betokens 
‘neutrality’ or, at the very least, the attempt to shelve the ephemeral forces that may valorize 
or render a text in a particular way such that it is read in a fashion that is ‘self-evident’, 
‘common sense’, or ‘obvious’ (cf. Cobley 2000). Therefore, the purpose of analysing a text is 
to find out how it works and, by extension, to help accumulate a sense of how all texts might 
work. Academic engagement with the text in this frame is decidedly not an exercise in 
‘distinction’ (Bourdieu 1984) geared to the inculcation of good ‘breeding’ or ‘taste’. It is 
more of a technical skill potentially accessible to all, as befits a democratic society.  
 
The transformation wrought by the concept of ‘text’, shifting the focus from the ‘good’ 
to the ‘analytic’, is the defining feature of contemporary humanities, although one would not 
know it if the only evidence on offer was that of the humanities’ humanist defenders. Yet, 
while the insights attendant on the concept of ‘text’ suffuse the humanities, there is one 
corollary of transdisciplinarity that the academy is more slow to accept: that science and the 
humanities are not irrevocably divided. The space afforded here is insufficient to discuss the 
fortunes of the ‘two cultures’; however, it is possible to briefly outline two areas where 
semiotics has contributed to the closing of the division. The first is relatively straightforward: 
it derives from the idea that if the humanities can be read as text, then there is absolutely no 
reason why the practices of science cannot be read as text also. Indeed, semiotics has given 
birth to one of the foremost exemplars of the understanding of nature with reference to textual 
and semiotic principles: biosemiotics. In identifying the semiotic basis of natural processes, 
biosemiotics has fundamentally challenged the mechanist worldview that is routinely 
promulgated by schoolteaching’s reliance on a Newtonian model of science.  
 
Second, there is the more complicated critique, at the level of philosophy of science, 
whereby the arts and humanities are placed alongside the sciences in a sometimes non-
hierarchical relationship between different kinds of knowledge of the universe. 
Cybersemiotics (Brier 2008), comprising much of biosemiotics, compels a vision of life, 
consciousness and cultural meaning as constituted by the continuities of nature and evolution. 
In this, it does not differ from general semiotics in the contemporary period; however, 
cybersemiotics specifically addresses life/consciousness/cultural meaning with reference to 
the qualities of experience each renders. It challenges physicalist science, with its ideal of 
third person knowledge, replacing it with an imperative to consider first person embodied 
consciousness. This is not to be underestimated: bourgeois humanism, by default, has 
connected well with common sense because it has always been predicated on its own, 
instrumental version of the first person: individualism. Yet, unlike much contemporary 
cultural analysis or constructivism which sees knowledge as constructions and plays of 
language and power, cybersemiotics is predicated on the embodiment of first person 
consciousness, which thus puts consciousness in relation to nature as continuous over plant 
and animal existence. Organism, environment, cognition, signs and reality – none of these are 
issues to be settled by one discipline. For this reason, cybersemiotics is transdisciplinary, 
tracking those areas in the humanities and the sciences where there have traditionally been 
materialist, organismic orientations in understanding phenomena and where there have been 
semiotic, cognitive orientations, also seemingly dictated by the phenomena with which they 
have been most concerned. This is summed up by Brier’s (2010: 1907-11) “cybersemiotic 
star”: 
 
 
 
The four areas of knowledge that cybersemiotics identifies obviously demand 
transdisciplinarity. Moreover, as Brier argues, they also demand a theory of the observer. 
Physics, he notes (2010: 1911), relies on the notion of an observer of physical ‘events’ but  
 
it does not have a theory of what the observer is that goes further than computation and 
information . . . Meaning, experience, qualia and will are still outside that paradigmatic 
foundation of physics which, through chemistry, leads into general cell and body 
physiology 
 
One might easily add to this that the humanities need a theory of the observer. The ‘other’ 
humanities, particularly through semiotics, have been diligent in questioning the role of 
agents in the world. The humanists, on the other hand, have seemed to fall back on the 
assumption of an absolute, universal human agency, even as that agency is being nullified in 
the dismantling of the humanities. For this reason, I believe that the convincing articulation of 
what the humanities are for depends on a stance that is anti-humanist. 
 
 
Anti-humanism 
 
The humanism that has often been taken as synonymous with the humanities can be 
summed up as “in short, bringing out what is best in us” (Solomon 1994: 50). This  ideology is clearly evident in so many of the protestations against the assault on the 
humanities that have been quoted so far. One can understand the knee-jerk response: 
Churchwell for example (2014: 29), is strident: 
 
The politicians and corporations telling us that the humanities do not matter are, by no 
coincidence, the same people who think of us only as workers and consumers, not as 
citizens or individuals, and who strip away our human rights, one by one. It is the 
wealthy who insist that we should seek only to work: we don’t need the humanities, 
they tell us, all we need is to labour in the marketplace that will enrich them, not us. 
 
What is left out here is that ‘they’ very much believe in the individual; it is precisely why 
‘they’ want to limit the opportunities open to others. The only collectivity ‘they’ can envisage 
without fear is the one that ‘they’ seek to impose. Clearly, the fundamental terms of the 
argument need to change from their individualistic/humanistic co-ordinates that are so tied up 
with the right to self-determination and enrichment. From the side of the humanities, such 
arguments are of a piece with the idea that the task of the humanities is to exalt “The best that 
has been thought and said”. However much the proponents of humanist humanities may think 
they have left such views behind by teaching about women writers, black artists, Navajo 
verbal expression, and Lao Tzu, their defence of the humanities in terms of breeding and the 
‘good’ resuscitates the ghosts of Matthew Arnold, F. R. Leavis, Mortimer Adler, Robert 
Hutchins and Lionel Trilling. In putting a notion of ‘the human’ at the centre of existence, the 
plight of the guardians of the ‘good’ is the “theoretical unevenness” that Althusser (1969: 
223) discerned in ‘socialist humanism’. Amidst the legacy of the terror and totalitarianism of 
the Soviet Union, many Marxists (including inside the Soviet Union) found themselves in a 
dilemma in denouncing this most prominent embodiment of supposed socialism. Althusser 
(1969: 236) suggests that socialist humanists fall back on a simplistic couplet, 
‘human/inhuman’: 
 
When, in the relations between Marxists and everyone else, the former lay stress on a 
socialist personal humanism, they are simply demonstrating their will to bridge the gap 
that separates them from possible allies, and they are simply anticipating the movement 
trusting to future history the task of providing the old words with a new content. 
 
Bourgeois humanism, Althusser shows (1969: 247), made ‘man’ the principle of all theory, 
with a shadowy concept of ‘inhumanity’ acting somewhere as ‘man’s’ obverse. In this way, 
humanism can have some purchase as a practical, ideological slogan, rooting out instances of 
‘inhumanity’. Humanism, additionally, may have some value as a “practical index” (1969: 
247) – in the case of humanist protestations against cuts in the humanities, perhaps as 
‘propaganda’ – but it is only “an imaginary treatment of real problems” ( ibid. 247); it has no 
theoretical value. 
 
Thus, anti-humanist thinkers – including those who have informed my thinking, such 
as Peirce, Sebeok, Hoffmeyer, Brier, Petrilli, Luhmann, Althusser, Agamben, Badiou and 
Deely - do not put the individualized human at the centre of existence. Nor do they trade in 
essences such as ‘self-interest’ or apply universal categories to people. They certainly do not 
take the tack of the arch-humanist, Condillac, in formulating ethics as a matter of self-interest. 
The anti-humanism in semiotics, in particular, envisages humans within semiosis and within 
Umwelten. Human agency is not a matter of standing outside semiosis and administering 
signs like an air traffic controller, as humanist understandings of the humanities would have 
it. Human agency is the Umwelt; we are within the products of semiosis that make up the 
objects of the humanities. 
 
 
Agency and Umwelt 
 
One could say, broadly, from a semiotic perspective, that there are two kinds of 
agency. The first might be called ‘sociosemiotic’, deriving from humans’ situation vis-à-vis 
semiosis in cultural formations. Since this is the topic of my essay, ‘To be means to 
communicate’ (also in this issue, pp.     ), I would direct readers to that essay’s provision of an 
attempt at an overview. The other kind of agency is ‘biosemiotic’, in the realm of semiosis 
which is putatively not subject to the vagaries of cultural or socio-political forces.  
This distinction, of course, is problematic for three main reasons. First, all semiosis is 
‘social’ in character in that it involves more parties than just one (Cobley and Randviir 2009); 
secondly, culture, as Sebeok repeatedly emphasized, is just one small compartment of nature; 
thirdly, as Agamben (1998) and others attest, semiosis ‘in nature’ is more frequently subject 
to the vagaries of socio-political forces than we often acknowledge. Nevertheless, agency has 
become a central theme in biosemiotics (Tønnessen 2014) and is instructive for the question 
of what the humanities are for. Biosemiotics has identified agency at very lowly biological 
levels, in the most rudimentary of organisms. For Hoffmeyer (1998), it is possible to identify 
agency in any organism that develops ‘semiotic competence’ in the semiosphere – that is, in 
any realm in which signification or communication may take place. Biosemiotics has been at 
pains to demonstrate the occurrence of semiotic competence in places that have not hitherto 
been considered for their agency. As far as the humanities are concerned, this is an important 
point because it not only indicates some measure of continuity across some components of 
humans and other organisms, but it also suggests the ways in which agency is ‘inhabited’. 
However, there is need for caution, because agency, as has been seen, is clearly taken for 
granted in the humanities (cf. Cobley 2010). Nevertheless, the concept of ‘inhabiting’ is 
crucial. 
 
‘Inhabiting’ might be said to be what organisms do in their Umwelt. They also ‘create’ 
their Umwelt through circulating signs – semiosis. Introduced by Jakob von Uexküll (1936, 
1937), the idea of Umwelt is pivotal in biosemiotics. For some it is the ‘world’ of signs which 
an animal creates/inhabits according to the sensorium it possesses. As delineated by Sebeok, 
especially after 1979, the Umwelt can be understood as a ‘model’ of its world that any 
organism might harbour; it allows that organism to survive, to navigate, to avoid predation, to 
seek out comfort and nourishment. It is the ‘objective’ world in Deely’s sense (2009), because 
the animal encounters phenomena that can only be ‘objects’ - not independent phenomena in 
the complete fullness of their awareness-independent physical “reality” - dosed with the 
experience that the animal’s sensorium affords. A moth, observes Hoffmeyer (2008: 200), 
 
is equipped with a totally silent Umwelt, apart from the narrow chink that is kept open 
for registering the bat’s fateful frequencies of approximately 20,000 Hz. When the bat 
is far away, the moth naturally veers away from the sounds, but when the bat comes up 
close, the moth instead makes sudden and unpredictable movements. The moth, in 
other words, displays Umwelt-controlled behaviour. 
 
The human Umwelt clearly does not afford humans the ability to detect the presence of bats 
with such a high degree of accuracy. However, it does allow humans a staggering capacity to 
differentiate objects in the world, supplemented with an ability to imagine new objects, 
including fictional ones, and to recognize the difference between “things” as things and 
objects as things in relation to some finite mind. In this, the human Umwelt is aligned with 
one of its main components: verbal language’s potential to produce an infinite number of 
sentences. 
 
The enhanced ability to imagine and the possibility of projecting that is inherent in the 
human Umwelt gives rise inevitably to ethics. Ethics requires both the ability to envisage 
another world more ethical than the present situation. Still, it is important to avoid the 
assumption that ethics implies agency in the form of will (Cobley 2007). The humanist 
defenders of the humanities seem to be suggesting that humanities subjects cultivate agency 
in the direction of ethical projects. This, of course, is a gross over-simplification of both 
structural/agentive interaction and ethics. 
 
 
Ethics 
 
Again, semiotics offers a corrective to the individualist accounts of human agency 
which subtend humanist defence of the humanities. The central insight of ethics as 
semioethics is that ethical imperatives cannot spring from individual predispositions. Petrilli 
has developed this with respect to the over-arching requirement of ‘responsibility’ and with 
reference to the work of Victoria Welby, Mikhail Bakhtin, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi and 
Thomas A. Sebeok. ‘Responsibility’ gives rise to ethics firstly because dialogue is not 
something to which one may subscribe; rather it is imposed on humans. While the individual 
human may choose to disregard the call of the other, that call does not cease. Thus, Petrilli 
(also in her work with Ponzio; see also Deely 2010: 107−125) developed the concept of 
semioethics to play out the imperatives attendant on this call, in contrast to willed ethics. “A 
global and detotalizing perspective on life and interpersonal relations”, writes Petrilli (2014: 
330),  
 
demands a high degree of otherness, readiness to listen to the other, a capacity for 
opening to the other and for dialogic interconnection with the other. According to this 
approach, the tendency toward dialogic detotalization prevails over totalization. 
Otherness opens the totality to infinity or to ‘infinite semiosis’. Such an orientation 
necessarily leads to the ethical order and investigates the condition of unconditional 
implication with the other beyond any specific ideological orientation. 
 
Semioethics thus implicates the human qua human. As the animal which is distinguished by 
its ability to recognize that there are such things as signs rather than simply responding to 
signs; Deely, Petrilli and Ponzio (2005) hold that the human is compelled to care for semiosis 
or, by association, all life on the planet. What circumstances are needed for this to be 
universally realized is not clear; however, the displacement of human uniqueness to the 
domain of semiosis from the essence that is beloved of the humanists constitutes a significant 
step. 
 
Semioethics has not been alone in questioning whether ethics represents the pinnacle of 
a human essence. Posthumanism, zoosemiotics and animal studies have been prominent in 
dispelling essentialism. Furthermore, they have also been instrumental in asking whether 
there is some pattern in nature at large whence ethics arises (see, for example, De Waal 
1996). If there is such a pattern, humanism’s already low stock is further depleted and the 
defence of humanities needs to look for more rigorous arguments. If the humanities are not 
the repository of good ‘values’, if they do not teach people how to live their lives, if they do 
not directly guarantee the preservation of both democracy and civilization or promote 
diversity, if they are not inherently ‘good’, if they do not prevent dehumanization, if they do 
not exist to shoulder these social roles, then what are the humanities for? 
                    other 
What the ⁄\ humanities are for 
 
Despite the fact that it is unsupported by a source and noted as apocryphal, Churchwell 
(2014: 29) nevertheless ‘quotes’ Richard Dawkins – fanatical promoter of science, arch-
mechanist, militant atheist, and the emotional punchbag of all manner of people, from 
fundamentalist Christians to vitalists – as saying, on exiting an art gallery in Florence, “But 
what’s all this art for?” She argues that this question articulates “a widely held view among 
the instrumentalists and technocrats who decide our society’s priorities”. Clearly, she does not 
believe that this is a fair and valid query.  
However, I am compelled to disagree – it is not a question particularly well put, but it 
is fair to ask it in general terms for the simple reason that the arts and humanities themselves 
have always been instrumental. They cannot be defended by humanists as the repository of 
values one minute and then be pronounced to be value-free the next. Typically, the 
humanities have been particularly instrumental when they have been denying their 
instrumentality: at moments of crisis such as the one they are experiencing now, or at 
moments of triumph when they have served the purposes of colonialism through intellectually 
subjugating non-Western people. The criticality which exposes such denial is a discourse on 
instrumentality, as is the meta-criticality which humanists eschew. Furthermore, criticality 
sees such denial also outside the colonial moment strictly defined; even in the humanities’ 
social tasks, lauded by the humanists, of upholding diversity, multiculturalism, tolerance and 
gaining local knowledge, there lies instrumentalism and even aggression (Alibhai-Brown 
2000). 
 
A distinct difference characterizes the ‘other’ humanities, a difference which humanist 
public relations neglects to mention. Many of the ‘other’ humanities, without bracketing 
social issues, have introduced, in varying degrees, questions of cognition and evolution. 
Diversity, for example, is conceived in the ‘other’ humanities as a matter of learning the 
multifarious ways in which the world can be modelled. It is not a matter of discovering the 
many artifacts accruing to different cultures around the globe and fitting them into a Western 
definition of universal values. Rather, in posthumanism and animal studies, to take two 
related instances, diversity entails considering how animality traverses human and non-human 
worlds and where the human gradually gives way to the machine. Such perspectives would 
seem to offer much more mileage regarding the question of what the humanities are for than 
either the affronted response of humanists that the question is indecorous, or the unsustainable 
assertions that the humanities guarantee the growth of a fictional human essence and the 
establishment of a utopian ‘good’ society. 
 
Semiotics’ perspective on the humanities is best exemplified by the conclusions from 
Sebeok’s essay, ‘Prefigurements of art’ (1979a). Written as a literature review of the extant 
work on ‘aesthetic behaviour’ in animals, the essay also draws illustrative conclusions about 
human modelling (for a fuller discussion, see ‘Enhancing survival . . .’, this issue, pp.   ). It 
does so by stressing that humans are unique in possessing a faculty for both verbal and 
nonverbal communication and that human brain functioning associated with these areas is 
such that there are certain limited continuities of the nonverbal between humans and non-
human animals. Surveying the nest decoration of the satinbird, dancing gorillas, painting 
chimps, ‘musical’ whales and others, Sebeok ultimately concludes that animals’ aesthetic 
behaviour is implicated in enhancing survival by not enhancing survival. Much, if not all, of 
the use-value of aesthetic behaviour consists in not appearing to possess use-value; 
nevertheless, it serves a long-term purpose for the animal, a purpose which consists of 
enhancing, extending, and embellishing the animal’s Umwelt, offering more variation and 
differentiation of the world and thereby potentially allowing the animal to more efficiently 
negotiate its environment to avoid predation and more efficaciously seek out sustenance. For 
non-human animals, classifying and differentiating in this way is obviously of paramount 
importance. For humans, the act of classifying involved in aesthetic behaviour, as well as its 
survival purpose, has become buried by layers of pleasure; aesthetic acts are not seen as a 
struggle for continued existence. But neither, anymore, are most sex acts. The very 
‘uselessness’ of classifying, then, may be what will help humans to solve problems that are 
present or lying in wait for us.  
What ‘Prefigurements’ demonstrates, ineluctably, is that ‘Knowledge is for something’. 
Knowledge was always for something. Knowledge will always be for something. It has a 
‘scaffolding’ dimension for humans (see Cobley and Stjernfelt 2015); it has other, more 
direct, functions, too, whether that knowledge is ‘scientific’ (based on putative ‘third-person 
experience’) or whether it is knowledge of a different stamp, rooted in ‘first-person 
experience’. In light of Sebeok’s essay, knowledge could never exist for its own sake, 
although its layering over might give that impression. As such, aesthetic behaviour is survival 
and it is so because of its contribution to the Umwelt of the animal engaged in such 
behaviour. Research in arts and humanities is to be conceived as a survey of what is being (or 
has been) explored in the human Umwelt, how that has taken place, how the human Umwelt 
is furnished and embellished, and also (where it is possible to discern) what contributions the 
arts and humanities are making to the survival of the species. This is what the humanities are 
for. They have a cognitive bearing that does not occlude their social bearing. The act of 
‘aesthetic classification’ discussed by Sebeok is the stock-in-trade of the arts. The work of 
‘aesthetic classification’ is central, also, to the humanities in its close relation to the arts.  
Like many other teachers in higher education, I have observed the way in which 
students feel that they have undergone a transformation following schooling in as relatively 
modest a practice as close reading. In the terms of semiotics, that transformation amounts to 
an augmented Umwelt, a firmer grasp on the richness of the world that humans inhabit. That 
grasp cannot be turned to instant economic advantage, even if such were desirable, although it 
might have some social uses. Like much culture, it is not without ‘use-value’, but the majority 
of its use-value consists in not appearing to possess use-value. The yahoos and philistines of 
economic instrumentality will not cease their questions in response to a demand that they 
simply accept this paradox.  
To preserve the humanities there is a need to be assured of what the humanities are for 
– that is, not to enable the saccharine sweet appreciation of a human essence but, in sum: to 
enhance survival chances in an Umwelt that is threatened by despoliation, to do so through 
principally cognitive rather than social means, to understand the limits of human agency and 
its continuity with the agency of other organisms on the planet, to grasp the relationship of 
responsibility entailed in the semioethics of this continuity and, as a product of the only 
animal that can recognize that there are such things as signs, not to allow overspecialization to 
become an obstacle to presiding, in a Hippocratic manner which does no harm, over the 
diversity of semiosis. 
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